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Abstract: Ground-level ozone concentrations have adverse effects e.g. on human
health and crops. Ozone is not emitted, but atmospheric reactions involving
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) cause its formation.
However, functions that relate precursor emissions to ozone concentrations are
typically neither convex nor monotonic. Others have shown that corner solutions,
where only one emission type is abated, can be cost-effective since the ozone-
formation is non-convex. This paper shows that the non-monotonicity implies an
even more radical abatement strategy in some cases: the optimal amount of NOx
emitted can be larger than the amount emitted in no-control.
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11. Introduction
Stratospheric ozone protects the earth against dangerous ultraviolet radiation
from the sun. Ground-level ozone, however, is the main component in smog, and it
has adverse effects on human health, animals, crops, trees and building materials
(Harrison, 1996; Heyes and Schüpp, 1995). Ozone is not emitted, but atmospheric
reactions involving nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs)
cause its formation. However, for a given amount of VOCs, increased NOx
concentrations have a declining marginal effect on ozone concentrations. This
implies that functions that relate the amounts of precursor emissions, of NOx and
VOCs, to ozone concentrations are non-convex.1
The practical relevance of different types of non-convexities are discussed
in Burrows (1986), while the implications of non-convexities on cost-effective
abatement policies are discussed in Repetto (1987). Repetto points out that ozone
formation is non-convex in New York, and that contour curves for ozone are
convex and almost parallel to the isocosts in the optimal solution. Consequently,
many emission vectors are almost optimal and “corner solutions”, where only one
emission type is abated, are potentially cost-effective.
This paper shows that the cost-effective abatement strategy can be even
more radical in some cases. The reason is that the ozone-function not only is non-
convex, it is also non-monotonic since increased NOx emissions give reduced
ozone concentrations in some cases.2 If the optimal solution also have this local
property, then the optimal amount of NOx emitted is larger than amount emitted
in no-control, implying negative abatement. The purpose of this paper is to
                                                          
1 Basically, a function f(x) is convex if, for any two points ,x x′ ′′  in the domain, the condition
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' 1 1f x f x f x xθ θ θ θ′′ ′ ′′+ − ≥ + −  is satisfied for all 0 1θ< < . See for instance Sydsaeter and
Hammond (1995) for an exact definition.
2 If the value for the function f(x) always is increased when the value of x is increased, then f(x) is a
monotonic (or monotonically increasing) function. See for instance Chiang (1984).
2illustrate these implications of non-monotonicity formally rather than to formulate
actual regulatory strategies.
In USA there has been severe problems with smog in Metropolitan areas,
for instance in Los Angeles and New York. Originally ozone was thought of as a
local pollutant, and controls focused on reducing hydrocarbon emissions (Farrel et
al., 1999), which is a type of VOC. However, ozone is the substance for which
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), established in title I of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), is most widely violated (Repetto, 1987), and
the NAAQS for ozone were violated within 27 states in 2001 (EPA, 2001). In such
states, certain emission reducing technologies for stationary sources of NOx and
VOCs are required by title I. In addition, VOC emissions must be reduced by 15%,
compared to 1990 levels, within six years (Heninger and Shah, 1998). Some of the
regulations within title I also address the long-range transport of ozone and
precursors. Krolewski and Mingst (2000) provides an overview of NOx regulations
in USA, while Henderson (1995) investigates the effects of the non-attainment
status on air quality.
In addition to the technological controls on NOx in USA, emissions have
been traded under the NOx budget (title I) among 12 states during the summer
season for the last two years, while the Acid Rain Program under title IV in CAAA
allows emission averaging. Emission averaging means that NOx emissions per unit
electricity produced at a plant can be larger than required by the standard, as long
as the average emission-factor over all plants owned by the company doesn’t
violate the standard.
The classic Los Angeles type of urban smog is not experienced in Europe
(Harrison, 1996). Still, for 1990 emissions, the WHO health guideline criteria for
ozone exposure will typically be exceeded some days over the year in many
European Countries (Amann et al., 1998b). The European policy towards ground-
3level ozone has followed a dual track of (a) national emission ceilings for NOx and
VOCs, without any trade between or within3 countries, and (b) legislation on
technological standards. The obligations are signed upon in protocols within the
UN/ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), see
UN/ECE (1996, 1999a). The parties within LRTAP are well aware of the long-range
transport of ozone and precursors, and the RAINS model is used to calculate cost-
effective abatement policies for all Europe. See Alcamo and Hordijk (1990) for a
documentation of the RAINS model (without ozone module), and Amann et al.
(1999) for recent scenarios prepared for the convention. However, RAINS cost
curves are mainly based on technological abatement strategies, and only for
positive abatement. The type of effects considered in this paper is therefore ruled
out in RAINS simulations. See Cofala and Syri (1998) for a documentation of NOx
abatement cost curves used in the RAINS model, and Klimont et al. (2000) for a
documentation of VOC cost curves.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
overview of ground-level ozone formation, while a city model for cost-effective
abatement policies, consistent with the early approach towards ground-level
ozone in USA, is developed in section 3. A regional model that accounts for long-
range transport of ozone and precursors is developed in section 4. Different types
of cost-effective solutions are identified for both models, and implications of non-
monotonicity are illustrated. Section 5 concludes the analysis.
                                                          
3 Klaassen and Nentjes (1997) did not find any evidence for trades where permissions to emit were
transferred from one party to another in exchange for money within European countries. However,
many European countries have used market instruments to reduce emissions (UN/ECE, 1999b).
42. Ground-level Ozone Formation
Ozone is not emitted, but atmospheric reactions involving NOx and VOCs cause its
formation. The following illustration of ozone formation is based on Cleveland and
Graedel (1979) and Heyes and Schöpp (1995).
Sunlight (v) split nitrogen dioxides (NO2) into nitrogen monoxides (NO) and
a single oxygen atom (O)
2NO hv NO O+ → + ,                          (1.1)
where h is Planck’s constant. The single oxygen atom (O) reacts with a oxygen
molecule (O2) and produces ozone (O3)
2 3O O O+ → .                          (1.2)
However, ozone reacts with nitrogen monoxides so that ozone is removed again
3 2 2O NO O NO+ → + ,            (1.3)
and a steady-state ozone concentration in a relatively unpolluted environment is
given by the ratio
2
3
NO
O k
NO
= ,             (1.4)
where k is a constant. However, volatile organic compounds in effect competes
with ozone in (1.3), so that nitrogen monoxides are transformed into nitrogen
dioxides without the consumption ozone, and this leads to increased net ozone
production. The ozone formation is therefore effective if there are stable
concentrations of both NOx and VOCs, in addition to sunlight. On the other hand,
if the concentration of NOx is large, the ozone-generating effect of VOCs is
reduced. Increased NOx emissions can therefore give reduced ozone formation in
cases where the initial concentration of NOx is large, see figure 1.
(Figure 1 about here).
5Figure 1 is taken from Amann et al. (1998a). It shows typical contour curves
(isopleths) for mean ozone concentrations in Europe. “Factor” 1 gives 1990
emissions for all European countries, and it is assumed that all countries reduce
their emissions by 40% at factor 0.6, etc. The non-monotonic effect of NOx
emissions on ground-level ozone is illustrated by the upward-sloping parts of
contour-curves in the figure at the right.
Similar effects of increased NOx emissions are also reported elsewhere, for
instance in Cleveland and Graedel (1979), Glasson (1981) and in van Ierland and
Schmieman (1999). According to Glasson (1981) there are also considerable
evidence to suggest that part of the ozone-reduction experienced in Los Angeles is
caused by increased NOx emissions. For VOCs, increased emissions give increased
ozone values in figure 1. However, others have found a slight non-monotonicity
also for hydrocarbons (a type of VOC), see Repetto (1987). The spatial aspect is also
important for ground-level ozone. For instance, increased NO emissions give
reduced ozone concentrations close to the emitting source, see (1.3). However,
since this produces NO2, ozone concentrations will typically increase at locations
further away from the emitting source, see (1.1) and (1.2). See Cleveland and
Graedel (1979) for a discussion of this subject.
3. The City Model
A model for reduced ground-level ozone concentrations in a city is developed in
this section. Different types of cost-effective solutions, which minimise total
abatement costs for NOx and VOCs, subject to a constraint on ground-level ozone,
will be identified. At first it is assumed that emissions are constrained by their no-
control amounts, but this assumption will be relaxed. Since a city has a limited
extension and since we only consider abatement possibilities for sources within
6the city, the long-range atmospheric transport of ozone and precursors between
different regions are not modelled explicitly.4 Others, for instance Repetto (1987)
and Kim et al. (1998), have used similar approaches. They study ozone reductions
in the New York Metropolitan region and in California’s San Joaquin Valley
respectively. The concentration of ground-level ozone in the city is given by
( )3 ,nox vocO f e e=   (2)
where enox and evoc are emitted amounts of NOx and VOCs in the city, while O3 is
the concentration of ground-level ozone.5 The slopes of contour curves, which are
combinations of NOx and VOC emissions such that ozone concentrations are
constant, are given by
3 0
voc
n
nox
vdO
de f
de f
=
= − ,  (3)
where fn and fv are finite partial derivatives of the f-function with respect on e
nox
and evoc respectively. Based on figure 1, it is assumed that increased VOC emissions
always give increased ozone concentrations. However, for a given amount of VOCs,
increased NOx emissions are assumed to give increased ozone concentrations only
if the emitted amount of NOx is smaller than a certain value, ( )voceβ , which
corresponds to a point where a contour curve is horizontal in figure 1. If the
emitted amount of NOx is larger than ( )voceβ , it is assumed that additional NOx
emissions give reduced ozone concentrations, so that
( )
( )
( )
0 |
0,  0 |
0 |
nox voc
nox voc
v n
nox voc
e e
f f e e
e e
β
β
β
> <

> = =

< >
  .                            (4)
                                                          
4 The specification in (2), which gives the ozone concentration, allows exogenous long-range
transport. Such exogenous terms are, however, suppressed by the notation.
5 Ozone concentrations can be measured in different units. See for instance Amann et al. (1998b)
and Kim et al. (1998). These differences are, however, not important for the present paper.    
7The abatement of NOx and VOC emissions are defined by
,
nox nox nox
nc
voc voc voc
nc
r e e
r e e
≡ −
≡ −
                      (5)
where ,  nox vocnc nce e >0 are emitted amounts of NOx and VOCs in no-control, defined by
the amounts that would be emitted in a market economy in the absence of
governmental controls on NOx and VOC emissions. Minimal abatement cost, over
all emitting sources in the city, is given by
( ), ;    0,  0 ,nox voc nox nox voc vocnc ncC g r r e r e r= ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥                (6)
while marginal abatement costs for NOx (gn) and VOCs (gv), which are the partial
derivatives of (6) with respect on rnox and rvoc respectively, are given by
0 | 0  
0, | 0   0  
|  0
nox nox nox
nc
nox nox nox nox
n nc nc
nox nox nox
nc
r e e
g e r e e
r e e
= = ⇔ =

∈ ∞ > > ⇔ < <

=∞ = ⇔ =
,                           (7.1)
0 | 0  
0, | 0   0
|  0
voc voc voc
nc
voc voc voc voc
v nc nc
voc voc voc
nc
r e e
g e r e e
r e e
= = ⇔ =

∈ ∞ > > ⇔ < <

=∞ = ⇔ =
.                           (7.2)
It is also assumed that nng  and vvg  are strictly positive. This implies that marginal
abatement costs for NOx are increased if the abated amount of NOx increases
partially, while marginal costs for VOCs are increased if VOC abatement increases.
In addition, marginal abatement costs are zero for zero abatement, positive for
positive abatement and infinite if the emitted amount is zero. Isocosts are
combinations of NOx and VOC emissions such that abatement costs are constant,
and the slope of an isocosts is given by
0
0
voc
n
nox
vdC
de g
de g
=
= − ≤ .   (8)
 The cost-effective solution for reduced ground-level ozone concentrations is
defined by the feasible emission vector (enox, evoc) that gives least costs among
8those feasible emission vectors that doesn’t violate the target for ground-level
ozone concentrations. The optimisation problem is therefore given by
( )
( )  . .    
  . .   0 ,  0 ,
nox voc
nox nox voc voc
nc nce ,e
nox voc
nox nox voc voc
nc nc
min g e - e ,e - e
s t  f e ,e
s t   e e e e
α≤
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
  (9)
where the definitions of abatement are substituted into (a) the arguments of the
cost function and (b) the constraints on abatement, and α  is the target for
ground-level ozone. The Lagrangian function is given by
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
               
               ,
nox nox voc voc nox voc
nc nc
nox nox nox nox nox
upper nc lower
voc voc voc voc voc
upper nc lower
L g e - e ,e - e f e ,e
e e e
e e e
λ α
µ µ
µ µ
= − + −
+ − +
+ − +
              (10)
 where λ  is the shadow price on the ozone-restriction, while
, , ,nox nox voc vocupper lower upper lowerµ µ µ µ  are shadow prices for upper and lower restrictions on NOx
and VOC emissions respectively. The first-order (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for an
optimal solution are given by6
0nox noxn n upper lowerg fλ µ µ− − + = ,                               (11.1)
                                         0voc vocv v upper lowerg fλ µ µ− − + = ,                                                (11.2)
( )( ) 0nox vocf e ,eλ α − = ,                                                    (11.3)
( )
( )
0, 0,
0, 0,
nox nox nox nox nox
upper nc lower
voc voc voc voc voc
upper nc lower
e e e
e e e
µ µ
µ µ
− = =
− = =
         (11.4)
( ) , 0, 0nox voc nox nox voc vocnc ncf e ,e e e e eα ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ,          (11.5)
, , , , 0nox nox voc vocupper lower upper lowerλ µ µ µ µ ≥ .            (11.6)
First we consider the case where the constraint on ozone is non-binding, defined
by ( )nox vocf e ,eα > . Then, by (11.3), 0λ = . Suppose gn>0 in this case. Then, by
                                                          
6See for instance Sydsaeter and Hammond (1995).
9(11.1) and (11.6), 0noxupperµ > , and then nox noxnce e=  by (11.4). But this is a contradiction
since (7.1) implies nox noxnce e<  when gn>0. Consequently, 0λ =  implies gn=0 and
nox nox
nce e=  from (7.1). By symmetry, VOC emissions are also equal to no-control
values if 0λ = . Obviously, resources are not spent on reducing emissions if the
emitted amounts in no-control gives ozone-concentrations that doesn’t exceed
the targeted amount.
In the following it is assumed that no-control emissions violates the
restriction on ozone concentration. Consequently, 0λ >  and, by (11.3),
( )nox vocf e ,eα = . It is also assumed that some amounts of both NOx and VOCs can
be emitted without violation of the restriction.7 The optimal solution is also
characterised by strictly positive emitted amounts since marginal abatement costs
for a substance is infinite if the emitted amount is zero8, and by (11.4) this implies
0nox voclower lowerµ µ= = . Also, since fv>0, it follows from (11.2) and (11.6) that 0vg > ,
implying voc vocnce e<  from (7.2), which in turn imply 0
voc
upperµ =  from (11.4). In total,
the first order conditions can be simplified to
0noxn n upperg fλ µ− − = ,          (12.1)
0v vg fλ− = ,                                      (12.2)
( )nox vocf e ,eα = , 0,λ >          (12.3)
( ) 0nox nox noxupper nce eµ − = ,                               (12.4)
0noxupperµ ≥ , 0nox noxnce e− ≥ .                  (12.5)
                                                          
7 In the 1980s, several states in the Northeastern USA recognised that it was impossible for them to
attain the ozone standard with in-state controls alone (Farrell et al., 1999).
8Suppose that zero NOx is emitted in the optimal solution. Then gn is infinite by (7.1) and 0
nox
upperµ =
by (11.4). Then, by (11.1), nfλ = ∞ . Since fn by assumption only takes finite numbers,  must be
infinite. Then, by (11.2), gv must be infinite also (the lower constraint can also be positive, but then
the emitted amount is zero and gv is infinite), implying zero VOC emissions from (7.2). But in this
case both NOx and VOC emissions are zero in the optimal solution, and this contradicts the
assumption that some amounts of NOx and VOCs can be emitted without violation of the
restriction.
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First we consider the case where 0noxupperµ = . By (12.1) and (12.2) the optimal
solution satisfies
n n
v v
g f
g f
− = − ,               (13)
in this case, and, by (3) and (8), this implies that an isocost and a contour curve for
ozone are tangents to each other. This is a standard finding in economics: relative
costs are balanced against relative benefits in the optimal solution. Also, by (12.3),
the value of the contour curve for ozone that goes through the optimal point is the
targeted amount of ozone. Figure 2 illustrates the optimal solution. Isocosts take
increasing values from no-control towards the origin, while contour curves take
increasing values upwards. The vector ( )* *,nox voce e  gives the cost-effective
solution.
(Figure 2 about here).
In figure 2, both NOx and VOCs are abated in the optimal solution. It has been
shown that VOC abatement always is strictly positive. However, the abated
amount of NOx in the optimal solution can be equal to zero even if 0noxupperµ = . In
that case, nox noxnce e=  such that gn=0 by (7.1). But then, by (12.1), fn must be zero too.
This is a special case where the slope of the contour curve for ozone for the value
α  by coincidence is equal to zero exactly at noxnce , see figure 3.
(Figure 3 about here).
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Now we consider the case where 0noxupperµ > . By (12.4) this implies nox noxnce e= , and
gn=0 by (7.1). In this case, the abated amount of VOCs in the optimal solution is
given implicit by ( ),nox vocncf e eα = . In addition, by (12.1), fn<0 since gn=0 and
, 0noxupperλ µ > . Therefore, from (3), the optimal solution is located on the upward-
sloping part of the contour curve for ozone. This case is illustrated in figure 4.
(Figure 4 about here).
The intuition for this result is that costs are increased if we slide down the contour
curve for ozone from the optimal point in figure 4, while positions to the right for
the optimal point are out of the domain for the cost function. The corner solutions
for abatement, illustrated in figures 3 and 4, are possible only because the ozone
function is non-convex.9 Consequently, this analysis supports the informal
argument in Repetto (1987): corner-solutions can be optimal as a consequence of
the non-convex ozone-function.
However, in Wolfgang (1999) it is shown that it is incorrect to restrict
emissions by their no-control values. Firstly, it is obviously technological feasible
for a firm to emit more than the amounts that are optimal in the absence of
                                                          
9 See footnote 1 for the definition of a convex function. Let x’ and x’’ be two points on the contour
curve for ozone for the value of the constraint. Then ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' ' 1f x f x f x f xα θ θ′′ ′′= = = + − . A
straight line between two points on the contour curve, for instance in figure 4, gives larger values
for ozone since contour curves are convex and increasing upwards. This implies that
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' 1 ' 1f x f x f x xθ θ θ θ′′ ′′+ − < + − , so that the ozone-function is non-convex in this domain.
However, consider a hypothetical case where the ozone-function is strictly convex in the whole
domain. In this case contour curves must be concave. We also assume that increased NOx emissions
gives a partial increase in ozone for low NOx concentrations. The contour curves are therefore
falling in their whole domain in this hypothetical case. Suppose now that the optimal amount of
NOx emissions is equal to the no-control value in this hypothetical case. Then, since the contour
curves for ozone are falling and isocosts are horizontal at no-control emissions for NOx, the contour
curve for the value of the constraint crosses an isocost from above in the optimal solution.
Consequently, there exist points in-between the isocost and the contour curve that gives fewer
costs and less ozone concentrations than the optimal solution, and this is a contradiction. This
implies that, given the assumptions about the cost function and the partial effect of increased NOx
12
governmental controls. Secondly, it can be optimal for a profit maximising firm to
emit an amount larger than no-control if emissions taxes are negative. From a
social point of view negative abatement and emission subsidies are contra-
intuitive for most cases. However, in the case of non-monotonic pollution
functions, the emitted amounts in the optimal solution can be larger than no-
control. It is easy to see this if we prolong the isocost in figure 4 by imagination
such that it crosses the contour curve for ozone. Clearly, locations in-between the
imaginary line-segment and the contour curve gives less abatement costs and
smaller ozone concentrations, compared to the point where the curves cross each
other. The optimal amount of NOx emitted is therefore larger than the no-control
value in that case.
The restrictions on maximum emissions are dropped in the following. Also,
since the global minimum for abatement costs by construction must be located at
the no-control emission vector, marginal abatement costs are assumed to be
negative for negative abatement. See Wolfgang (1999) for a discussion. In total,
marginal abatement costs are assumed to take the same sign as the abated
amount so that10
( ) ( )
( ) ( ).
nox nox
n nc
voc voc
v nc
sign g sign e e
sign g sign e e
= −
= −
               (14)
The new first order condition for NOx is given by
0n ng fλ− = ,              (15)
and all optimal solutions satisfies (13) and (12.3). Suppose that the optimal solution
is located on the upward-sloping part of the contour curve for ozone, implying
                                                                                                                                                                     
emissions at low NOx concentrations, corner solutions for abatement are possible only if the ozone-
function is non-convex.
10 An alternative formulation is
0 , 0 , 0 ,nox nox nox nox nox noxn nc n nc n ncg e e g e e g e e> ⇔ < = ⇔ = < ⇔ >
0 , 0 , 0 .voc voc voc voc voc vocv nc v nc v ncg e e g e e g e e> ⇔ < = ⇔ = < ⇔ >
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fn<0 from (3). Then, by (15), gn<0, and from (14) it follows that 
nox nox
nce e> .
Consequently, if the optimal solution is located on the upward-sloping part of the
contour curve, the amount of NOx emitted in the optimal solution is larger than
the no-control value. This case is illustrated in figure 5.
(Figure 5 about here).
In the optimal solution, the isocost and the contour curve for ozone are tangents
to each other, and the amount of ozone is exactly the targeted amount. These
necessary conditions for optimality are, however, not sufficient for optimality. But
if, in addition, the Lagrangian function is concave over the whole domain, then a
stationary point for the Lagrangian function is an optimal solution, see Sydsaeter
and Hammond (1995). The condition for local maximum is less strict: if the boarded
Hessian matrix is positive at the stationary point under consideration, then this is a
local maximum. Figure 6 illustrates cases where the necessary conditions for cost
minimisation are satisfied even though the stationary points fail to be optimal
solutions.
(Figure 6 about here.)
The diamond on the right-hand side in figure 6 is a local cost-minimum. However,
the circle at the left gives fewer costs and smaller ozone concentrations. The
diamond on the bottom of the contour curve for ozone shows a local cost-
maximum since locations in-between the isocost and the contour curve for ozone,
in the close neighbourhood of that point, gives fewer costs and smaller ozone
concentrations.
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4. The Regional Model
In this section, a model for reduced ground-level ozone concentrations at several
locations within a large region is developed. A cost-effective solution minimises
total abatement costs in the region, subject to the constraints on ground-level
ozone at all locations under consideration. Obviously, the atmospheric transport of
substances must be accounted for in this model. Models for cost-effective
abatement policies that account for ozone formation and atmospheric transport of
precursors have also been used by others, see for instance Amann et al. (1998a)
and van Ierland and Schmieman (1999).
Suppose there are n emitters in total (the units can for instance be states in
USA and countries in Europe), while there are restrictions on ozone concentrations
at m locations. Let the index and set of emitters be i and I respectively, such that
{ }1,...,i I n∈ = , and let the index and set of locations be j and J respectively, such
that { }1,...,j J m∈ = . The cost-effective solution for this problem minimise the sum
of abatement costs, subject to the constraints on ground-level ozone
concentrations,
( )
( ) { }
,
1 1
,
. .      , , ..., , ,        1, ..., ,
nox voc
i i
nox nox voc voc
i nc  i nc  ii ie e
i I
nox voc nox voc
j n n j
min g e - e e - e
s t f e e e e j mα
∈
≤ =

                    (16)
where gi is the cost function for emitter i, 
nox
nc ie  and 
voc
nc ie  are strictly positive no-
control emissions of NOx and VOCs respectively for emitter i, noxi  e  and 
voc
i  e  are
actual emissions, fj is the ozone function for location j, and 0jα >  is the restriction
on the ozone concentration at location j. First order conditions for NOx and VOCs
for an emitter are given by
i i
j
n j n
j J
g fλ
∈
= ,           (17.1)
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,
i i
j
v j v
j J
g fλ
∈
=          (17.2)
where 
in
g , 
iv
g  are marginal abatement costs for NOx and VOCs for emitter i, and
i
j
nf , i
j
vf   are partial derivatives of the ozone function for location j with respect on
emitter i’s NOx and VOC emissions respectively,11 and the shadow prices on ozone
restrictions at various locations are given by 0jλ ≥ . It is assumed that the partial
derivatives of the cost functions satisfies
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i
i
nox nox
n nc ii
voc voc
v nc ii
sign g sign e e
sign g sign e e
= −
= −
,                (18)
cf. equation (14).
For locations sufficiently remote from the emitter under consideration, it is
assumed that the partial derivatives of the corresponding ozone-functions, with
respect on NOx and VOC emissions from this particular emitter, is zero. However,
for the remaining locations it is assumed that 0
i
j
vf >  while i
j
nf  can take both signs. If
all binding constraints on ozone concentrations are sufficiently remote from the
emitter under consideration, then, by (17.1), (17.2) and (18), emitted amounts in
the optimal solution are given by no-control values for that emitter. In the
following it is assumed that all emitters are sufficiently close to influence the
concentration of NOx, VOCs and ozone in at least one location j where 0jλ > .
Then, by (17.2), 0
iv
g > , and by (18), voc voci nc ie e< . This means that the emitted
amount of VOCs in the optimal solution is less than the no-control value for every
emitter.
                                                          
11 The intended interpretation of the units in I in this paper is European countries or states in USA.
The analysis could, however, easily be generalised to account for the specific location for every
emitting source. Little is gained by this in the present paper, and that generalisation would also
require an investigation of special cases where single sources emit either NOx or VOCs or both in
no-control, and the analysis would be somewhat unfocused. The emitting units are countries in the
RAINS model too.
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The sign of the right-hand side in (17.1) is ambiguous since 
i
j
nf  can take
both signs. If increased NOx emissions from a particular emitter give increased
ozone concentrations at some locations, and the shadow prices for ozone are large
enough for these locations, then the right-hand side in (17.1) is strictly positive,
implying 0
in
g >  and nox noxi nc ie e<  by (18). However, if increased NOx emissions for
the emitter under consideration give reduced ozone concentrations at locations
where the shadow prices for ozone are large, so that the right-hand side in (17.1) is
negative, then 0
in
g <  and nox noxi nc ie e>  by (18). Consequently, the amount of NOx
emitted is larger than the no-control value if the sum of the λ -weighted marginal
effects of increased NOx emissions on ozone concentrations is negative, and vice
versa. Since the right-hand sides in (17.1) and (17.2) are emitter-specific, the
optimal solution can be characterised by reduced NOx emissions (compared to no-
control) for some emitters while emissions are increased for other emitters. Also,
negative abatement for NOx is most likely to occur for emitters that are close to
high-NOx areas where increased NOx concentrations gives reduced ozone
concentrations. The reason is that an emitter has relatively larger influence on NOx
concentrations at locations close to the emitter compared to locations far away.
Figures 2, 3 and 5 illustrate optimal solutions also for the regional model if
the label “ 3O α= ” is replaced by the function
( )* * * ** 1 1, , ..., , , ..., ,nox voc nox voc nox voci j j i i n n
j J
W f e e e e e eλ
∈
= ,             (19)
where each variable in the vector ( )* ** , ,nox vocj J k I k Ie eλ ∈ ∈ ∈  is the optimal solution for the
variables in the corresponding vector ( ), ,nox vocj J k I k Ie eλ ∈ ∈ ∈ . Equation (19) can, somewhat
inaccurately, be interpreted as the value of ground-level ozone concentrations in
the optimal solution, as a function of the emitted amounts for emitter i.  The right-
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hand side in (17.1) divided by the right-hand side in (17.2), multiplied by –1, gives
the slope of a contour curve for the Wi-function. Consequently, in an optimal
solution, the isocost curve for an emitter i has the same slope as a contour curve
for the Wi-function.
5. Conclusions
Others have studied implications of non-convexities in ozone formation, and it is
indicated that corner solutions for abatement are potentially cost-effective. The
purpose of this paper has been to illustrate implications of non-monotonicity in
ozone formation, rather than to formulate actual regulatory strategies. Two models
for cost-effective reductions of ground-level ozone have been developed in this
paper: a city model and a regional model. However, both models gave the same
kinds of cost-effective solutions.
The main findings in this paper are as follows. The optimal amount of VOC
emitted is less than the no-control value in the city model. For NOx, however, the
emitted amount in the optimal solution is less than the no-control value only if the
optimal solution is located on the downward-sloping part of the contour curve for
ozone. If, on the other hand, the optimal solution is located on the upward-sloping
part of the contour curve, the optimal amount of NOx emitted is larger than the
no-control value. In the regional model, VOC abatement is strictly positive for every
emitter, while NOx abatement is strictly positive for a particular emitter if the
contour curve for the “ozone-value function” is downward-sloping for this emitter
in the optimal solution. If, on the other hand, the contour curve for the “ozone-
value function” is upward-sloping for a particular emitter, then the emitted
amount of NOx is larger than the no-control value for this emitter.
It would be trivial to extend the model in this paper and show that the
optimal emission vector in principle can be implemented by appropriate emission
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taxes under standard assumptions. If the optimal amount of NOx emitted is larger
than no-control for a unit (country or state), then the optimal emission tax for NOx
is negative for this unit. For the regional model, such emission taxes must be
emitter-specific, for instance country- or state-specific, while only one NOx tax rate
and one VOC tax rate is required for the city model. If the deposition pattern differs
substantially for sources within a country, then the optimal tax structure must of
course account for these differences too.
The assumption that marginal abatement costs are zero if the abated
amount of the substance under consideration is zero, is important for the
outcomes of the analysis. If something else is assumed, then negative abatement
does not necessarily imply an optimal solution on the upward-sloping part of the
contour curve for ozone, and vice versa. However, unless negative abatement is
ruled by an inaccurate assumption, the optimal solution for NOx emissions can in
general be larger than the emitted amount in no-control.
Both NOx and VOC emissions have other adverse effects than the formation
of ground-level ozone. For instance, NOx emissions have influence on acidification,
eutrophication and on the densities of fine particles (Lükewille et al., 2001). In
principle, a cost-effective policy must account for all environmental effects and
constraints. Positive NOx abatement can therefore be optimal when all
environmental constraints are accounted for, even if negative NOx abatement is
optimal in a particular optimisation that only accounts for the constraints on
ground-level ozone. Still, the targets for ground-level ozone may dominate the
optimal abatement strategies, at least for some emitters.
Suppose, however, that the optimal amount of NOx emitted is larger than
the no-control value for the short-run target, but less than no-control value for the
long-run target. Suppose also that there are additional cost elements for changed
19
emissions due to frictions in the economy. In this case, the optimal dynamic
control of NOx emissions may imply positive NOx abatement even in the short-run.
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Figure 1:Typical patterns of ozone behaviour in Europe.
            (a) Low initial NOx concentrations           (b) High initial NOx concentrations
Source: Amann et al. (1998a).
The explaining text after (a) and (b) is added.
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